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ABSTRACT.  Preference reversals are found in measurements of ambiguity aversion 
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are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they 
cannot be explained by context-dependent weightings of attributes. We offer an 
explanation based on Sugden’s random-reference theory with different elicitation 
methods generating different reference points. Measurements using willingness to pay 
are confounded by loss aversion and overestimate ambiguity aversion. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  One of the greatest challenges to the classical paradigm of rational choice was put 
forward by preference reversals, first found by Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971): 
strategically irrelevant details of framing can lead to a reversal of preference.  Grether 
& Plott (1979) confirmed this phenomenon while using real incentives and controlling 
for several potential biases.  The question then arises what true preferences are, if they 
exist at all.  This paper shows that preference reversals also occur in one of the most 
important domains of decision theory today: choice under uncertainty when 
probabilities are unknown (ambiguity).  
  The preference reversals that we find are of a fundamentally different nature than 
those found before.  They cannot be explained by different weightings of attributes in 
different evaluation modes, but entail a complete reversal of preference within one 
attribute.  Details are given in the discussion in Section 2. 
  We investigate two commonly used formats for measuring ambiguity attitudes.  
The first is to offer participants a straight choice between an ambiguous and a risky 
prospect, and the second is to elicit participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for each of 
the prospects.  We compare the two approaches in simple Ellsberg two-color 
problems.  In three experiments, WTP for the risky option strongly exceeds that for 
the ambiguous option, with almost no participant expressing higher WTP for the 
ambiguous urn than for the risky urn.  Remarkably, however, this finding also holds 
for the group of participants who in straight choice prefer the ambiguous urn.  Hence, 
in the latter group the majority assigns a higher WTP to the not-chosen risky urn, 
entailing a preference reversal.  There are virtually no reversed preference reversals, 
suggesting the reversals found are systematic and are not due to noise.   
  The contradictory findings of WTP versus choice raises the question which of 
these, if any, measures true ambiguity attitudes.  To distinguish between the two 
findings, and allow for the possibility that at least one does not reflect true ambiguity 
attitude, we add qualifiers.  The finding of higher WTP for the ambiguous than for the 
risky urn is called WTP-ambiguity aversion, and a direct choice of the risky urn rather 
than the ambiguous one is called choice-ambiguity aversion.  A fourth experiment 
with certainty equivalent measurements instead of WTP will suggest that WTP- 3 
ambiguity aversion entails a uniform overestimation, also for participants who did not 
exhibit preference reversals.  
  Using Sugden’s (2003) and Schmidt, Starmer, & Sugden’s (2008) generalization 
of prospect theory with a random reference point, we develop a quantitative model 
that explains the pattern of ambiguity attitudes and preference reversals in our 
experiments.  The different elicitation methods promote the perception of different 
reference points.  Preferences under choice depend on the attitudes toward unknown 
probabilities, as is warranted for measurements of ambiguity attitudes.  WTP 
evaluations are, however, determined primarily by loss aversion, which distorts WTP-
ambiguity measurements.  Recent studies supporting the importance of loss aversion in 
risky and in riskless choice include Fehr & Götte (2007) and Gaechter, Johnson, & 
Hermann (2007). This paper demonstrates its importance under ambiguity. 
  Birnbaum et al. (1992) and Weber (1994) developed a psychogical model for 
decision under risk that is very similar to our decision model.  Their model assumes 
that a decision maker perceives the evaluation of a risky prospect as an estimation 
problem.  An overestimation results if an outcome delivered by the prospect is below 
the estimation.  Similarly, underestimations can result.  Asymmetric perceptions of 
overestimations relative to underestimations can then have the same impact on 
decisions as loss aversion.  This psychological model, when combined with Sugden’s 
random reference model, can be applied to our case of decision under ambiguity.  It 
then leads to the same conclusions as Schmidt, Starmer, & Sugden’s (2008) model, 
which combines prospect theory with Sugden’s random reference model. 
  In our experiments, WTP-ambiguity aversion is considerably stronger than 
choice-ambiguity aversion.  Thus, loss aversion under WTP generates a much 
stronger aversion to ambiguous prospects than aversion to unknown probabilities does 
under choice.  This finding has implications for the valuation of ambiguous prospects 
in applications.  In choice situations, ambiguity aversion leads to a widespread but not 
uniform preference of unambiguous options and to moderate valuation differences.  
Consider for example the ambiguous risks surrounding genetically modified food.  
We would expect the majority of consumers to choose genetically unmodified 
alternatives of some product as long as the price difference with modified alternatives 
is not very large.  In situations more similar to WTP, however, for instance when 
evaluating various financial investments simultaneously, our study predicts a strong 
preference for unambiguous options and a large discount in the valuation of  4 
ambiguous options (Easley & O’Hara, 2008; Zeckhauser, 2006).  Our findings 
suggest, for instance, that in contingent valuation studies the willingness to pay for 
reductions in ambiguous security or health risks may be mismeasured due to loss 
aversion (Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, & Martinsson, 2004; The Economist, 2008).    
  It is well known that changes in psychological and informational circumstances can 
affect behavior under ambiguity.  Examples of such circumstances are accountability 
(being evaluated by others or not; Curley, Yates, & Abrams 1986), relative competence 
(whether or not there are others knowing more; Tversky & Fox 1995; Heath & Tversky 
1991; Fox & Weber 2002), gain-loss framings (Du & Budescu 2005), and order effects 
(Fox & Weber 2002).  Closest to the preference reversals reported in our paper is a 
discovery originating from Fox & Tversky (1995): ambiguity aversion is reduced when 
measured through separate rather than joint evaluations (Du & Budescu 2005, Table 5; 
Fox & Weber 2002).  From this finding, preference reversals can be generated.  The 
preference reversals reported in our paper are more fundamental.  We compare two 
evaluation methods while keeping such psychological and informational circumstances 
constant.  For example, all evaluations will be joint and not separate.  Thus, the 
preference reversals cannot be ascribed to changes in information or to extraneous 
framing effects.  They must concern an intrinsic aspect of evaluation.   
  The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 presents our basic 
experiment, and our preference reversals.  Section 3 presents a control experiment 
where no preference reversals are found, supporting our theoretical explanation.  
Whereas the WTP was not incentivized in our basic experiment so as to avoid income 
effects, it is incentivized in Section 4, showing that this aspect does not affect our 
findings.  Section 5 considers a modification of the random incentive system used in 
Section 4 and shows that this modification does not affect our basic finding either.  
Section 6 discusses the effect of gender and age for the pooled data of all three 
experiments.  A theoretical explanation of our empirical findings is in Section 7. The 
final section discusses implications and concludes. 
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2.  Experiment 1; Basic Experiment 
 
Participants. N = 59 econometrics students from the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
in the Netherlands participated in this experiment, carried out in a classroom. 
 
Stimuli.  At the beginning of the experiment, two urns were presented to the 
participants, so that when evaluating one urn they knew about the existence of the 
other.  The known urn
1 contained 20 red and 20 black balls and the unknown urn 
contained 40 red and black balls in an unknown proportion.  Participants had to select 
a color at their discretion (red or black), announce their choice, and then make a 
simple Ellsberg choice.  This choice was between betting on the color selected for the 
(ball to be drawn from the) known urn, or betting on the color selected from the 
unknown urn.  Next they themselves randomly drew a ball from the urn chosen.  If the 
drawn color matched the announced color they won ￿50; otherwise they won nothing.  
  Participants were also asked to specify their maximum WTP for both urns 
(Appendix A).  In this basic experiment, the WTP questions were hypothetical to 
prevent possible house money effects (Thaler & Johnson 1990) arising from the 
significant endowment that would have been necessary to enable participants to pay 
for prospects with a prize of ￿50.  Participants first made their choice and 
subsequently answered the WTP questions. 
  All choices and questions were on the same sheet of paper and could be answered 
in the order that the participant preferred.  We also recorded the participants’ age and 
gender. 
 
Incentives.  Two participants were randomly selected and played for real.  These 
participants were paid according to their choices and could win up to ￿50 in cash. 
 
Analysis.  In this experiment as in the other experiments in this paper, usually a clear 
direction of effects can be expected. Therefore, unless stated otherwise, one-sided tests 
                                                 
1 This term is used in this paper.  In the experiment, we did not use this term.  We used bags instead of 
urns, and the unknown bag was designated through its darker color without using the term “unknown.”  
We did not use balls but chips, and the colors used were red and green instead of red and black.  For 
consistency of terminology in the field, we use the same terms and colors in our paper as in the original 
Ellsberg (1961).  6 
were employed.  Further, tests are t-tests unless stated otherwise.  The abbreviation ns 
designates nonsignificance.  The WTP difference is the WTP for the risky prospect 
minus the WTP for the ambiguous prospect.  It serves as an index of WTP-ambiguity 
aversion.  WTP-ambiguity aversion holds if the index is positive. 
 
Results.  In straight choice, 22 of 59 chose ambiguous (37%; p < 0.05, binomial).  
Thus, we find a majority of choice-ambiguity aversion.  The following table shows 
the average WTP separately for choice-ambiguity seekers and choice-ambiguity 
averters.   
 
TABLE 1. Willingness to Pay in ￿ 
  WTP   
risky 
WTP 
ambiguous 
WTP 
difference 
 t-test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  12.25  9.50  2.75   t21=2.72, p < 0.01 
Choice-ambiguity averse  11.64  6.27  5.37   t36=6.7, p < 0.01 
Two-sided t-test  t57 = 0.33,  
ns 
t57 = 2.14, 
p < 0.05 
t57 = 2.01, 
p < 0.05 
 
 
  The choice-ambiguity seekers are in general more risk seeking with higher WTP 
values, although their WTP for the risky prospect is not significantly higher than with 
the choice-ambiguity averters.  Their WTP for the ambiguous prospects is, obviously, 
much higher than it is for the choice-ambiguity averters.  The latter value the risky 
prospect on average ￿5.37 higher than the ambiguous one (p < 0.01).  Surprisingly, 
choice-ambiguity seekers also value the risky prospect ￿2.75 higher than the 
ambiguous one (p < 0.01), which entails a preference reversal.  They exhibit choice-
ambiguity seeking but WTP-ambiguity aversion.  The following table gives 
frequencies of WTP-ambiguity attitudes and choice-ambiguity attitudes.  7 
. 
TABLE 2. Frequencies of WTP- versus Choice-Ambiguity Attitudes 
 WTP-ambiguity 
seeking 
WTP-
indifferent 
WTP-ambiguity 
averse 
Binomial 
test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  2  9  11  p = 0.01 
Choice-ambiguity averse  0  6  31  p < 0.01 
 
Almost no WTP-ambiguity seeking is found, not only among the choice-ambiguity 
averters but also among the choice-ambiguity seekers.  Thus, for 11 of 59 participants 
the WTP- and choice attitudes are inconsistent.  All these participants combine WTP-
ambiguity aversion with choice-ambiguity seeking.  No reversed inconsistency was 
found.  The number of the reversals found is large enough to depress the positive 
correlation between choice- and WTP-ambiguity aversion to 0.34 (Spearman’s r, p < 
0.05 two-sided), excluding indifferences.  We find significant WTP-ambiguity 
aversion for the choice-ambiguity seekers (p=0.01, binomial).  For choice-ambiguity 
averters this is clearly true as well (p < 0.01, binomial). 
 
Discussion.  We find prevailing choice-ambiguity aversion, but still 22 out of 59 
participants exhibit choice-ambiguity seeking.  For WTP there is considerably more, 
almost universal, ambiguity aversion, leading to preference reversals for 11 
participants.  Only 2 choice-ambiguity seekers are WTP-ambiguity seeking.  This 
result is particularly striking because straight choice and WTP had to be made 
together on the same sheet.  No preference reversal occurs for the choice-ambiguity 
averters.  As explained in the introduction, the reversals observed here are 
fundamentally different from preference reversals found before.   
  A classical example of a preference reversal concerns a “p-prospect” of a 97% 
chance at $4 versus a “$-prospect” of a 31% chance at $16.  Here a pro in the 
probability (“p”) dimension has to be weighed against a pro in the outcome (“$”) 
dimension.  The majority of subjects prefers the p-prospect in direct choice but, 
nevertheless, assigns a lower monetary value to it than to the $-prospect.  Such 
preferences have been confirmed with real incentives (Grether & Plott 1979).  
Apparently, in monetary evaluations, people weigh the money attribute higher than in  8 
direct choice.  Such different weightings of attributes in different decision tasks have 
been widely documented (Bleichrodt & Pinto 2002; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic 1988).  
  Differential weightings of attributes as just described cannot explain the 
preference reversals that we find.  In our choices, the prize to be gained is the same in 
all choices.  Hence, our preference reversal must be explained by a complete switch of 
preference within the likelihood attribute, with one event weighted more heavily in 
direct choice but the other in WTP.  Section 7 provides a detailed theoretical 
explanation of the phenomenon just mentioned.  It is based on the assumption that 
during their WTP task the participants take the risky prospect as a reference point for 
their valuation of the ambiguous prospect.  Experiment 2 will test this explanation by 
discouraging the choice of the risky prospect as a reference point.  
  An alternative explanation instead of genuine preference reversals that could be 
suggested to explain our data is an error-conjecture.  It entails that WTP best 
measures true preferences, which supposedly are almost unanimously ambiguity 
averse, and that straight choice is simply subject to more errors.  The WTP-ambiguity 
seeking that 11 choice-ambiguity averters exhibited would then concern simple errors 
and would not entail genuine preference reversals.  One argument against this 
hypothesis is that straight choices constitute the simplest value-elicitations 
conceivable, and that the literature gives no reason to suppose that straight choice is 
more prone to error than WTP.  This holds the more so as straight choices were 
carried out with real incentives.  Further arguments against the error hypothesis are 
provided in Experiments 2 and 4, which will test and reject the hypothesis.   
  The preference reversals in Experiment 1 were observed without incentivized 
WTP and in a classroom setting.  WTP with real incentives may differ from 
hypothetical WTP (Cummins, Harrison, & Rutström 1995; Hogarth & Einhorn 1990).  
To test the stability of our finding in the presence of monetary incentives and in 
controlled circumstances in a laboratory we conducted Experiments 3 and 4. 
 
3.  Experiment 2; Certainty Equivalents from Choices to 
Control for Loss Aversion 
 
  Experiment 2 tests a loss-aversion explanation of the preference reversal found in 
the basic experiment.  It also tests the error conjecture described in the preceding  9 
section.  Further it shows that WTP increases the valuation difference between risky 
and ambiguous prospect for all participants, that is, also for those for whom no 
preference reversal is observed because they always prefer risky. 
 
Participants. N = 79 participants participated as in Experiment 1. 
 
Stimuli.  All stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, starting with a simple Ellsberg 
choice, with one modification.  Instead of making a WTP judgment, participants were 
asked to make 9 choices between playing the risky prospect and receiving a sure 
amount, and 9 choices between playing the ambiguous prospect and receiving a sure 
amount (Appendix A).  Thus, there was no direct comparison between the risky and 
ambiguous prospects’ values.  The choices served to elicit the participants’ certainty 
equivalents, as explained later. 
 
Incentives.  The prizes were as in Experiment 1.  Participants first made all 19 
decisions.  Then two participants were selected randomly.  For both, one of their 
choices was randomly selected to be played for real by them throwing a 20-sided die, 
where the straight choice had probability 2/20 and each of the 18 CE choices had 
probability 1/20.  
 
Analysis.  For each prospect, the CE was the midpoint of the two sure amounts for 
which the participant switched preference.  All participants were consistent in the 
sense of specifying a unique switching point.  The CE difference is the CE of the risky 
prospect minus the CE of the ambiguous prospect.  CE-ambiguity aversion refers to a 
positive CE-difference. 
 
Results.  In straight choice, 26 of 79 chose ambiguous (33%; p < 0.01, binomial).  
Thus, we have a majority of choice-ambiguity averters.  The following table gives 
average CE values.  10 
 
TABLE 3. CEs in ￿ 
  CE risky  CE ambiguous  CE difference  t-test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  16.73  17.60  -0.86   t25=1.61, p=0.06 
Choice-ambiguity averse  14.84  11.90    2.94  t52=4.84, p < 0.01 
Two-sided t-test  t77 = 1.53,  
ns             
t77 = 4.75, 
p < 0.01 
t77 = 4.02, 
p < 0.01 
 
 
  The choice-ambiguity seekers are again more risk seeking with higher CE values 
as in Experiment 1.  Their CE for the risky prospect is not significantly higher than for 
the choice-ambiguity averters, but is very significantly higher for the ambiguous 
prospect.  Now, however, the choice-ambiguity seekers evaluate the ambiguous 
prospect higher, reaching marginal significance and entailing choice consistency.  The 
following table compares the CE-ambiguity attitudes with choice-ambiguity attitudes. 
 
TABLE 4. Frequencies of CE- versus Choice-Ambiguity Attitudes 
  CE-ambiguity 
seeking 
CE-
indifferent 
CE-ambiguity 
averse 
Binomial 
test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  8  16  2  p = 0.05 
Choice-ambiguity averse  4  18  31  p < 0.01 
 
There is considerable consistency between CE- and choice-ambiguity attitudes, with 
only few and insignificant inconsistencies.  Hence, we do not find preference 
reversals here.  There is a strong positive correlation of 0.64 between choice- and CE-
ambiguity attitudes (Spearman’s r, p < 0.01 two-sided), excluding indifferences.  We 
reject the hypothesis of CE-ambiguity seeking for choice-ambiguity averters (p < 
0.01, binomial), and we reject the hypothesis of CE-ambiguity aversion for the 
choice-ambiguity seekers (p = 0.05).  Participants who are indifferent in the CE task 
distribute evenly between choice-ambiguity seeking and aversion. 
 
Results Comparing Experiments 1 and 2.  For both prospects, CE values in Experiment 
2 are significantly higher than the WTP values in Experiment 1 (p < 0.01).  The CE 
differences in Experiment 2 are smaller than the WTP differences in Experiment 1 for  11 
both choice-ambiguity seekers and choice-ambiguity averters (p < 0.01), suggesting 
smaller ambiguity aversion in Experiment 2. 
 
Discussion.  In Experiment 2 the CE differences are negative for choice-ambiguity 
seekers.  Hence, no preference reversals are found here.  The error-conjecture that 
choice-ambiguity seeking be due to error is rejected because there is significant CE-
ambiguity seeking there.  CE values are generally higher than the WTP values in 
Experiment 1 whereas the differences between risky and ambiguous are smaller.  They 
are so both for the choice-ambiguity seekers, who exhibit preference reversals under 
WTP, and for choice-ambiguity averters, who exhibit no preference reversals.  The 
consistency of CE-ambiguity aversion with choice-ambiguity aversion suggests that 
WTP-ambiguity aversion entails an overestimation. 
 
 
4.  Experiment 3; Real Incentives for WTP 
 
N = 74 participants participated similarly as in Experiment 1.  Everything else was 
identical to Experiment 1, except the incentives. 
 
Incentives.  At the end of the experiment, four participants were randomly selected for 
real play.  They were endowed with ￿30.  Then a die was thrown to determine 
whether a participant played his or her straight choice to win ￿50, or would play the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) (BDM) mechanism (both events had equal 
probability).  In the latter case, the die was thrown again to determine which prospect 
was sold (both prospects had an equal chance to be sold).  Then, following the BDM 
mechanism, we randomly chose a prize between ￿0 and ￿50.  If the random prize was 
below the expressed WTP, the participant paid the random prize to receive the 
prospect considered and played this prospect for real.  If the random prize exceeded 
the expressed WTP, no further transaction was carried out and the participant kept the 
endowment (Appendix B).  It is well known that under the BDM mechanism it is in 
the participants’ best interest to report preferences truthfully. 
  12 
Results.  In straight choice, 15 of 74 chose ambiguous  (20%; p < 0.01, binomial), 
implying a majority of choice-ambiguity aversion.  The following table gives average 
WTP. 
 
TABLE 5. Willingness to Pay (BDM) in ￿ 
  WTP  risky  WTP  
ambiguous 
WTP   
difference 
t-test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  13.44  11.21  2.23   t14=2.58, p=0.01 
Choice-ambiguity averse  13.46  7.14  6.31   t58=6.21, p<0.01 
Two-sided t-test  t72 = 0.01,  
ns             
t72 = 1.99, 
p = 0.05 
  t72 = 1.97, 
  p = 0.05 
 
 
The WTPs for both groups and both prospects are slightly (but not significantly) 
higher than the WTPs in experiment 1 (p>0.5, two-sided).  Also the WTP differences 
are not significantly different from Experiment 1 (p>0.5, two-sided).  All patterns of 
Experiment 1 are confirmed.  In particular, the choice-ambiguity seekers exhibit 
WRT-ambiguity aversion.  The following table compares WTP- with choice-
ambiguity attitudes. 
 
TABLE 6. Frequencies of WTP- (through BDM) versus Choice-Ambiguity Attitudes 
  WTP-ambiguity 
seeking 
WTP-
indifferent 
WTP-ambiguity 
averse 
Binomial 
test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  0  9  6  p < 0.05 
Choice-ambiguity averse  1  13  45  p < 0.01 
 
Here 6 out of 15 choice-ambiguity seekers were inconsistent in exhibiting WTP-
ambiguity seeking.  All other choice-ambiguity seekers exhibited WTP-indifference, 
and not even one of them exhibited WTP-ambiguity seeking.  Of 59 choice-ambiguity 
averters 1 was inconsistent and exhibited WTP-ambiguity seeking.  Clearly, there is 
no positive correlation between choice-ambiguity aversion and WTP-ambiguity 
aversion (Spearman’s r = -0.051, ns two-sided) excluding indifferences.  We find 
significant WTP-ambiguity aversion for the choice-ambiguity seekers (p < 0.05, 
binomial).  The same holds for the choice-ambiguity averters (p < 0.01, binomial).  13 
  The distribution of bids in experiment 3 is very similar to that in experiment 1.  
There is no systematic over- or underbidding (WTP > 25 or WTP = 0) that would 
suggest that participants misunderstood the BDM mechanism.  The participants who 
reversed their preference did so over a large range of buying prices
2. 
 
Discussion.  With all parts of the experiment, including WTP, incentivized, this 
experiment confirms the findings of Experiment 1. The reversals are therefore not 
caused by incentive effects or low motivation for the WTP task. 
 
 
5.  Experiment 4; Real Incentives for Each Participant in the 
Laboratory 
 
This experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following aspects. 
 
Participants.  N = 63 students participated in the laboratory.  Now about 25% were 
from other fields than economics. 
 
Incentives.  The experiment was part of a larger session with an unrelated task.  Every 
participant received ￿10 from the other task and up to ￿15 from the Ellsberg task.  
Each participant played his or her choice for real.  Participants were paid in cash.  
Now the nonzero prize was ￿15 instead of ￿50. 
 
Results.  In straight choice, 17 of 63 chose ambiguous, implying a majority of choice-
ambiguity aversion (27%; p < 0.01, binomial).  The following table gives average 
WTP values.  Note that the prize of the prospects was ￿15 now. 
 
                                                 
2 The participants who reversed their preference from ambiguous in choice to risky in valuation had the 
following pairs of WTPs (WTP risky/WTP ambiguous): (25/20), (20/15), (20/10), (12.5/5), (10/5), and 
(3/2).  14 
TABLE 7. Willingness to Pay in ￿ when the Nonzero Prize is ￿15 
  WTP risky  WTP ambiguous  WTP difference  t-test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  5.63  4.65  0.99   t16=1.56, p=0.07 
Choice-ambiguity averse  5.23  2.71  2.53   t45=8.53, p < 0.01
Two-sided t-test  t61 = 0.53,  
ns             
t61 = 2.90, 
p < 0.01 
  t61 = 2.49, 
  p = 0.01 
 
 
The pattern is identical to previous results.  The following table compares WTP-
ambiguity aversion with choice-ambiguity aversion. 
 
TABLE 8. Frequencies of WTP- (Lab) versus Choice-Ambiguity Attitudes 
  WTP-ambiguity 
seeking 
WTP-
indifferent 
WTP-ambiguity 
averse 
Binomial 
test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  2  6  9  p < 0.05 
Choice-ambiguity averse  0  6  40  p < 0.01 
 
The positive correlation between choice- and WTP-ambiguity aversion is 0.39 
(Spearman’s r, p < 0.01 two-sided), excluding indifferences.  The hypothesis of 
WTP-ambiguity seeking can be rejected for the choice-ambiguity seekers (p < 0.05, 
binomial).  The same holds for the choice-ambiguity averters (p < 0.01, binomial).   
 
Interviews. After the experiment we approached the 9 participants who exhibited 
inconsistencies, pointing out the inconsistency and asking them if they wanted to 
change any experimental choice.  None of them wanted to change a choice and they 
explained that they were ready to take their chance and try the ambiguous prospect in 
a straight choice. In the WTP evaluation, they commonly started from the easier to 
assess risky prospect and then adjusted the WTP of the ambiguous prospect 
downward for the higher uncertainty. Although they chose ambiguous in straight 
choice (choice-ambiguity seeking), they were not willing to pay as much for this 
prospect as for the risky one (WTP ambiguity aversion).   
 
Discussion.  This experiment replicates the findings of experiment 1 in the laboratory 
and with real incentives for every participant.  It shows that the preference reversal is  15 
not due to low motivation in the classroom.  The interviews reject the conjecture that 
suggested that choice-ambiguity seeking be due to error. The interviews with the 
inconsistent participants suggested that in the WTP task the risky prospect serves as a 
reference point for the WTP of the ambiguous prospect. 
 
 
6.  Pooled Data: Gender and Age Effects 
 
  The four experiments conducted for this study provide comparable choice and 
valuation data and can therefore be pooled into a large data set with 275 participants.  
For the evaluations, we combine WTP- and CE-ambiguity aversion into one index of 
general revealed ambiguity aversion, leaving aside what the exact theoretical 
interpretation of this phenomenon is.  In this way, we can consider the effects of age 
and gender.  There is much interest into the role of such personal characteristics 
(Barsky et al. 1997; Booij & van de Kuilen 2006; Cohen & Einav 2007; Donkers et al. 
2001; Hartog, Ferrer, & Jonker 2002; Schubert et al. 1999). 
  Table 9 shows the valuations for risky and ambiguous prospects, valuation 
differences, and actual choices, separated by age and gender.  Valuations are 
calculated here as the percentage of the monetary prize of the prospect.  For example, 
a WTP of ￿15 for an ambiguous prospect with a prize of ￿50 gives a percentage 
valuation of 30.00.  
  The table shows that females hold significantly lower valuations for both the 
risky and the ambiguous prospect than do males.  Their valuation differences are not 
significantly smaller though.  Our finding is consistent with the evidence in the 
literature that women are more risk averse than men (Cohen & Einav 2007).  Booij & 
van de Kuilen (2006) argued that females’ stronger risk aversion can be explained by 
stronger loss aversion in a prospect theory framework.  The last column in the table 
shows significantly larger choice-ambiguity aversion among women than among men.  
This has also been found by Schubert et al. (2000) for the gain domain.   
  Although there is relatively little variation in age in our sample, we find that 
young students give lower valuations for both the risky and the ambiguous prospect, 
but are not more ambiguity averse than older students.  This is confirmed by 
correlational analysis, where age has a positive correlation with risky evaluation (r =  16 
0.15,  t(273) = 2.55, p = 0.01) and with the ambiguous evaluation (r = 0.11, t(273) = 
1.86, p= 0.06) but not with value difference (r = 0.06, t(273) = 0.97, ns) or with the 
percentage of choice-ambiguity aversion Thus, we have a majority of choice (r = 
-0.07, t(273) = 1.10, ns). 
 
TABLE 9. Age and Gender Effects in the Pooled Data 
 Percentage 
Valuation of 
Risky Prospect 
Percentage Valu-
ation of Ambiguous 
Prospect 
Valuation 
Difference 
Choice of 
Risky prospect 
(%) 
Females  (N=79) 24.77  14.64  10.13  79.7 
Males (N = 196)  31.23  22.64  8.59  63.3 
Two-sided t-test  p < 0.01  p < 0.01  ns  p < 0.05 
Age£19 (N=153)  26.48 18.39  8.09  73.9 
Age>19 (N=122)  33.00  22.79  10.21  67.2 
Two-sided t-test   p < 0.01  p = 0.01  ns  ns 
   Age ranged from 17 to 31 with median age 19.  There is no correlation between age 
and gender in the data. 
 
 
7.  Modeling Preference Reversals through Loss Aversion in 
Comparative WTP 
 
  This section presents a theoretical deterministic model that explains our data, 
building upon theories that have been employed to explain preference reversals under 
risk.  That the preference reversals found here cannot be ascribed exclusively to error, 
so that they must have a basis in an underlying core theory, was demonstrated in 
Experiments 2 and 4.  We use Sugden’s (2003) idea of random reference points.  He 
originally introduced it for expected utility theory.  It was generalized to prospect 
theory for decision under risk by Schmidt et al. (2008).  We extend it to decision 
under ambiguity, resulting in the random-reference dependent generalization of  17 
Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory for ambiguity, building on Gilboa’s 
(1987) and Schmeidler’s (1989) rank-dependent utility.   
  In what follows, we only consider prospects with at most one gain and one loss.  
For such prospects, the random-reference dependent generalization of rank-dependent 
utility and prospect theory agrees with those of most other theories used to analyze 
ambiguity, including multiple priors (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989) and the a-maxmin 
model.  Hence, our analysis is generic for most models of ambiguity in the literature 
today once Sugden’s reference dependence has been accepted.  We also sometimes 
consider Sugden’s random reference point theory when combined with the 
asymmetric loss function theory of Birnbaum et al. (1992) and Weber (1994), 
extending the latter from risk to ambiguity.   
 
Definitions.  Let f and g be uncertain prospects over monetary outcomes x, and let a 
constant prospect be denoted by its outcome.  Let V(f|g) denote the value of prospect f 
with prospect g as reference point.  Sugden’s (2003) random-reference generalization 
entails that g can be a prospect rather than a riskless outcome as it was in original 
prospect theory.  The value V(f|g) will be based on: (a) an event-weighting function 
W; (b) a utility function U(x|r) of outcome x if the reference outcome on the outcome-
relevant event is r, where U is scaled such that U(r|r) = 0 for all r; and (c) a loss 
aversion parameter l, with further details provided later.  Sugden (2003) provided 
conditions implying that U(x|r) is of the form j(U*(x) - U*(r)). 
 Let  r represent the risky prospect and a the ambiguous prospect of gambling on a 
color drawn from an urn with a known and an unknown proportion of black and red 
balls, respectively.  We consider four atomic events (“states of nature”) that combine 
results of (potential) drawings from urns—a black ball is/would be extracted from 
both the risky and the ambiguous urn (Event 1; E1; BRBA); a black ball from the risky 
urn and a red one from the ambiguous urn (Event 2; E2; BRRA); a red ball from the 
risky urn and a black ball from the ambiguous urn (Event 3; E3; RRBA); a red ball from 
both the risky and the ambiguous urn (Event 4; E4; RRRA).  Let us assume that the 
announced color to be gambled on is black; for red the problem is equivalent.  Let x 
be the prize to be won in case the color gambled on matches the color of the ball 
extracted from the chosen urn.   
  18 
Straight Choice.  We first consider straight choice. Table 10 displays the payoffs that 
result for each prospect under the four events. 
 
TABLE 10. Payoffs for the Risky and the Ambiguous Prospect under Straight Choice 
  E1 
(BRBA) 
E2 
(BRRA) 
E3 
(RRBA) 
E4 
(RRRA) 
a  x  0 x 0 
r  x x  0  0 
 
 Because  P(E1ÈE2) = 0.5, the event E1ÈE2 is unambiguous and r is risky.  
P(E1ÈE3) is unknown so that event E1ÈE3, and a, are ambiguous.  We assume that 
the reference point at the time of making the choice is zero (previous wealth). Then 
 V(a|0) = W(E1ÈE3)U(x|0) (1) 
and 
 V(r|0) = W(E1ÈE2)U(x|0), (2) 
where we dropped terms with U(0|0) = 0.
3  In Ellsberg-type choice tasks a minority of 
individuals prefer the ambiguous prospect over the risky prospect, with V(a|0) > 
V(r|0).  Then event E1ÈE3, the receipt of the good outcome x under a, receives more 
weight than event E1ÈE2, the receipt of the good outcome x under r: 
 Choice-ambiguity  seeking  Û W(E1ÈE3) > W(E1ÈE2). (3) 
Most people exhibit the reversed inequality, W(E1ÈE3) < W(E1ÈE2), with ambiguity 
aversion and with more weight for the known-probability event E1ÈE2.  Nevertheless, 
several people exhibit choice-ambiguity seeking.  We note that each single event 
E1,…,E4 will be weighted the same because each has the same perceived likelihood 
and the same perceived ambiguity, because of symmetry of colors.  The unambiguity 
of E1ÈE2 versus the ambiguity of E1ÈE3, and the different weightings of these events 
depending on ambiguity attitudes, are generated through the different likelihood 
interactions between E3 and E1 than between E2 and E1.  Note that choice-ambiguity 
                                                 
3 Thus, we need not specify the (rank-dependent) weights of the corresponding events in our analysis.  19 
aversion and -seeking are driven by the W-weighing of uncertain events; i.e., by the 
attitude of the decision maker towards ambiguity. 
 
Willingness to Pay and Loss Aversion.  We next turn to the WTP evaluation task.  We 
assume that the decision maker has determined a WTP value c for r, making the value 
of r–c neutral.  The following analysis holds true for any value of c.  That is, it holds 
true for any way in which the decision maker determined the WTP of r and, in 
particular, for any way in which the reference point was chosen there.  Hence, we 
need not commit to any way in which this was done. 
  As suggested by the interviews with our participants, we assume that the risky 
prospect serves as a reference point for the ambiguous prospect.  It is easier to 
produce a quantitative evaluation for risky because of the known probabilities and, 
hence, this way of thinking for WTP is natural irrespective of the actual straight 
choice made between the prospects.  More precisely, we will assume in what follows 
that the decision maker takes r–c as neutral and as reference point, so that WTP(a) 
makes a – WTP(a) equivalent to the neutral r–c.  That iss, V(a–WTP(a)|r–c) = 0.  
We analyze, for the sake of comparison, a–c.  Table 11 displays outcomes for various 
events. 
 
TABLE 11. Payoffs for the Risky and the Ambiguous Prospect under Straight Choice 
  E1 
(BRBA) 
E2 
(BRRA) 
E3 
(RRBA) 
E4 
(RRRA) 
a–c  x–c  –c x–c –c 
r–c  x–c  x–c  –c –c 
 
 
  For the evaluation of a–c, the events E1 and E4 are now taken as neutral (utility 0) 
according to the theory of Schmidt et al. (2008).  These events do not contribute to the 
evaluation, which is why they do not appear in the following Eq. 4.  In particular, we 
need not specify their rank-dependent weights.  E2 is now a loss event and E3 is a gain 
event for a–c.  Although the nonadditive decision weights of loss events can in 
principle be different than for gain events, many studies do not distinguish between 
such decision weights, and empirical studies have not found big differences (Tversky  20 
& Kahneman 1992).  (Note that loss aversion will be captured through a different 
parameter, namely l.)  We will therefore simplify the analysis and use the same 
weighting function for losses as for gains.   
  WTP-ambiguity aversion (WTP(a) < c) results if a–c is evaluated lower than r–
c.  Given that r–c is the reference point with V(r–c|r–c) scaled to be 0, this is 
equivalent to negativity of the following evaluation through Schmidt et al.’s (2008) 
theory. 
  WTP-ambiguity aversion   Û    
   V(a–c|r–c)  =  W(E3)U(x–c|–c) + lW(E2)U(–c|x–c)  <  0.  (4) 
Here l is the loss aversion parameter, which usually exceeds 1 indicating an 
overweighting of losses.  We next discuss utility U in some detail, and show that 
 U(x–c|–c)  =  -U(–c|x–c) (5) 
may be assumed.  All cases considered in the literature are special cases of Sugden’s 
 U(x|r)  =  j(U*(x) - U*(r)).   
In general, for moderate amounts as considered here, it is plausible that these 
functions do not exhibit much curvature, so that 
 U(x–c|–c)    »  x  and  U(–c|x–c)  » -x. 
Then Eq. 5 follows.  In prospect theory, outcomes are changes with respect to the 
reference point as in 
 U(x–c|r–c)  =  j(x - r), which implies U(x–c|–c) = j(x) and U(–c|x–c) = j(-x). 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) estimated j(x) = x
0.88 and j(-x) = -x
0.88.  Then Eq. 5 
holds exactly, also for large outcomes.  This assumption, called skew-symmetry, was 
central in Fishburn & LaValle’s (1988) theory.  Thus, we assume Eq. 5.  We divide 
Eq. 4 by U(0|x), and obtain: 
  WTP-ambiguity aversion   Û   W(E3) - lW(E2)  <  0. (6) 
  In the above analysis, given symmetry of colors, events E2 and E3 will have 
similar perceived likelihood and ambiguity.  In Eqs. 4 and 5, they are weighted in  21 
isolation and not in a union with another event.  Hence it is plausible that they have 
the same weights, W(E2) = W(E3).  Then Eq. 6 reduces to: 
  WTP-ambiguity aversion   Û   1 < l. (7) 
This inequality is exactly what defines loss aversion.   
  The asymmetric loss function theory of Birnbaum et al. (1992) and Weber (1994) 
similarly suggests a negative evaluation in Eq. 4.  Here the decision maker, when 
taking r as a point of comparison, will take the “overestimation” that the target r 
delivers at event E2 more seriously than the “underestimation” at event E3.  This 
theory was developed for decision under risk where it can explain risk aversion.  
Under the plausible assumption of W(E2) = W(E3) it similarly implies WTP-
ambiguity aversion for our case of decision under ambiguity.   
  Ambiguity played a role in the above evaluation process through its effect on the 
reference point.  Because only single events play a role in Eq. 6 and no unions as in 
Eq. 3, ambiguity attitudes did not play a role in establishing Eq. 7.  By this equation 
we can expect a higher WTP of the risky prospect as soon as loss aversion holds (l > 
1), irrespective of ambiguity attitude if the decision maker takes the risky process as 
the reference point.  A decision maker who is ambiguity neutral or seeking but loss 
averse will reveal WTP-ambiguity aversion.  Empirical studies have suggested that 
loss aversion is very widespread and strong.  Hence virtually all participants will 
exhibit WTP-ambiguity aversion, in agreement with our data. 
  The scenario analyzed above is, of course, only one of several possible ones.  In 
general, many choices of reference points are conceivable in reference-dependent 
theories.  Although subjects may resort to many heuristics for their evaluation, the 
phenomena in our theoretical analysis will play a significant role, implying that 
WTP(a) is lowered because of loss aversion leading to an overestimation of 
ambiguity aversion.  It is psychologically plausible that the reference point is related 
to r.  Loss aversion, which has the tendency of favoring the reference point relative to 
its alternatives by overweighting the cons of the alternatives relative to their pros, then 
decreases the value of a.  This is what the theoretical analysis of this section has 
demonstrated. 
  22 
8.  General Discussion 
  It is common in individual choice experiments not to pay for every choice made 
so as to avoid distorting income effects.  Hence, the random incentive system is 
generally used (Myagkov & Plott 1997; Holt & Laury 2002; Harrison et al. 2002), 
where one task is randomly selected to be played for real.  The validity of the random 
incentive system was demonstrated by Starmer & Sugden (1991), Hey & Lee (2005), 
and others.  Some papers explicitly tested whether it matters if for each participant 
one choice is played for real as in Experiment 4, or if only for some randomly selected 
participants one choice is played for real, as in our other experiments (Armantier 
2006, Harrison et al. 2007).  They found no difference.  The consistency of our results 
between experiments 1, 3, and 4 confirms this finding.  Baltussen et al. (2008) did 
find differences, but their stimuli were complex and concerned dynamic choices.  Our 
experiment only concerned simple static choices. 
  Systematic preference reversals as modeled in the preceding section cannot be 
expected to occur for CE valuations.  There the participants are involved in comparing 
the ambiguous prospect to a sure outcome for the purpose of choosing, which will not 
encourage them to search for other anchors.  The CE tasks are similar to the straight 
choices and can be expected to generate similar weightings and perceptions of 
reference points.  That the differences between ambiguous and risky CE evaluations 
are smaller than the corresponding WTP differences for both choice-ambiguity 
averters and choice-ambiguity seekers.  This finding further supports the theory of the 
preceding section.  It also underscores that the bias for WTP that we discovered at 
first through the observed preference reversals does not apply only to the minority of 
participants for whom this preference reversal arises.  Rather, it is a general 
phenomenon that concerns all participants. 
  Many studies have used willingness to accept (WTA) to measure ambiguity 
attitudes.  Here participants are first endowed with a prospect and are then asked for 
how much money they are willing to sell it.  As in the study of Roca, Hogarth, & 
Maule (2006) this procedure will encourage some participants, especially after having 
chosen ambiguous in the straight choice, to take the ambiguous prospect as reference 
point when determining its WTA. Our model therefore predicts a reduction in the 
observed preference reversals compared to WTP.  To test this prediction we  23 
conducted an experiment that was identical to Experiment 1, except that we asked 
participants for their WTA instead of WTP. The results are shown in Table 12.    
 
TABLE 12. Frequencies of WTA- versus Choice-Ambiguity Attitudes 
  WTA-ambiguity 
seeking 
WTA-
indifferent 
WTA-ambiguity
averse 
Binomial 
test 
Choice-ambiguity seeking  8  14  5  p = 0.87 
Choice-ambiguity averse  1  26  35  p < 0.001 
 
  As predicted, we observe that only a minority of the choice-ambiguity seekers 
commits a preference reversal under WTA. Still, reversals occur more often for choice-
ambiguity seekers than for choice-ambiguity averters. This is consistent with the 
assumption that, similar to WTP, the WTA of the risky prospect is easier to determine, 
and therefore more likely to serve as a reference point in the WTA task.  
  An interesting question is what happens if the reference point is changed 
extraneously.  Roca, Hogarth, & Maule (2006) found that when participants are 
endowed with the ambiguous prospect they indeed become reluctant to switch to the 
risky prospect if offered such an opportunity.  The authors explain such reluctance 
through loss aversion where the ambiguous prospect constitutes the reference 
prospect. This finding supports our theory.  Our theory is also consistent with the 
reduced aversion to ambiguous prospects if evaluated separately from risky options 
(Du & Budescu 2005; Fox & Tversky 1995), or if preceding the risky prospects (Fox 
& Weber 2002).  If the risky prospect is not (yet) present when the ambiguous 
prospect is evaluated, it obviously will not serve as a reference point.  Then the 
increase in aversion to the ambiguous prospect derived in the preceding section 
cannot arise. 
 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
  Preference reversals have affected many domains in decision theory.  We found 
that they also affect choice under ambiguity, even if psychological and informational 
circumstances are kept fixed.  The preference reversals found in our study are of a  24 
different nature than preference reversals found before, requiring a reversal of 
preference within one attribute.  The results are stable under real incentives and 
different experimental conditions.  They concern deliberate choices that were not 
made by mistake.  Our results support recent theories on reference dependence by 
Sugden (2003) and Schmidt et al. (2008).  These theories suggest that it is primarily 
loss aversion (or an asymmetric loss function as in Birnbaum et al., 1992, and Weber, 
1994) that generates a strong aversion to ambiguous options under willingness to pay.  
This implies that the often used willingness to pay measurements overestimate 
ambiguity aversion.  
  Our finding that WTP-ambiguity phenomena and choice-ambiguity phenomena are 
driven by different factors and exhibit different characteristics, has many empirical 
implications.  Examples include the evaluation of new treatments in the health domain, 
the evaluation of public programs, and investment decisions in a firm.  Extrapolation of 
ambiguity attitudes elicited from choices without concern for other factors that play a 
role will not correctly predict preferences in situations more similar to WTP, and vice 
versa.  For applications it will be valuable to develop a taxonomy of factors that affect 
choices under ambiguity in different situations. 
 
 
Appendix A.  Instructions Experiment 1 and 2 
 
Both experiments’ instructions started with the following description of prospects: 
Consider the following two lottery options: 
Option A gives you a draw from a bag that contains exactly 20 red and 20 
green poker chips.  Before you draw, you choose a color and announce it.  
Then you draw.  If the color you announced matches the color you draw you 
win ￿50.  If the colors do not match, you get nothing. (white bag) 
 
Option B gives you a draw from a bag that contains exactly 40 poker chips.  
They are either red or green, in an unknown proportion.  Before you draw, you 
choose a color and announce it.  Then you draw.  If the color you announced 
matches the color you draw you win ￿50.  If the colors do not match, you get 
nothing. (beige bag) 
 
In experiment 1 the participants were then asked to make a straight choice and give 
their WTP for both options:  25 
 
You have to choose between the two prospect options.  Which one do you 
choose? 
  O    Option A (bet on a color to win ￿50 from bag with 20 red and 20 green 
chips) 
  O    Option B (bet on a color to win ￿50 from bag with unknown proportion 
of colors)  
 
Additional hypothetical question: 
 
Imagine you had to pay for the right to participate in the above described 
options with the possibility to win ￿50.  How much would you maximally pay 
for the right to participate in the prospects? Please indicate your valuations: 
 
I would pay ￿_________ to participate in Option A (bet on a color to win ￿50 
from bag with 20 red and 20 green chips). 
 
I would pay ￿_________ to participate in Option B (bet on a color to win ￿50 
from bag with unknown proportion of colors). 
 
In experiment 2 the participants were asked to make a straight choice and 18 choices 
between sure amounts and the prospects: 
 
Below you are asked to choose between the above two options and also to 
compare both options with sure amounts of money.  Two people will be 
selected for real play in class.  For each person one decision will be randomly 
selected for real payment as explained by the teacher.  
 
[1, 2]  You have to choose between the two prospect options.  Which one do 
you choose? 
  O    Option A (bet on a color to win ￿50 from bag with 20 red and 20 green 
chips) 
  O    Option B (bet on a color to win ￿50 from bag with unknown proportion 
of colors)  
 
Valuation of prospects.  26 
Now determine your monetary valuation of the two prospect options.  Please 
compare the prospect options to the sure amounts of money.  Indicate for both 
options and each different sure amount of money whether you would rather 
choose the sure cash or try a bet on a color from the bag to win ￿50! 
 
Option A (bet on color from bag with 20 red and 20 green chips to win ￿50)  
or   sure amount of ￿: 
[3]  Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿25 for sure 
[4]  Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿20 for sure 
[5]  Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿15 for sure 
[6]  Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿10 for sure 
[7]  Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿5 for sure 
[8]  Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿4 for sure 
[9]  Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿3 for sure 
[10] Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿2 for sure 
[11] Play Option A        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿1 for sure 
 
Option B (bet on color from bag with unknown proportion of colors to win 
￿50)  or   sure amount of ￿: 
[12] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿25 for sure 
[13] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿20 for sure 
[14] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿15 for sure 
[15] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿10 for sure 
[16] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿5 for sure 
[17] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿4 for sure 
[18] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿3 for sure 
[19] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿2 for sure 
[20] Play Option B        O O O O   or      O O O O  get ￿1 for sure 
 
Make sure that you filled out all 18 choices on this page! 
 
In both experiments we asked the following question at the end: 
Please give your age and gender here: 
Age:_________________   Gender:  male   O O O O   female   O O O O   27 
 
Appendix B.  Instructions Experiment 3 
 
In experiment 3 the hypothetical WTP questions have been replaced by the following 
real payoff WTP decision using the BDM mechanism:  
You have to buy the right to make a draw from the above described bags with 
the possibility to win 50￿.  The procedure we use guarantees that a truthful 
indication of your valuation is optimal for you, see details below at (*).  How 
much do you maximally want to pay for the right to participate in the prospect 
options? Please indicate your offers: 
I will pay ￿_________ to participate in Option A (bet on a color to win ￿50 
from bag with 20 red and 20 green chips). 
I will pay ￿_________ to participate in Option B (bet on a color to win ￿50 
from bag with unknown proportion of colors). 
 
* 
The procedure is as follows: The experimenter throws a die to determine 
which option he wants to sell.  If a 1,2, or 3 shows up, Option A will be 
offered; if a 4,5, or 6 shows up, Option B will be offered.  After the option for 
sale has been selected, the experimenter draws a lot from a bag that contains 
50 lots, numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 48, 49, 50.  The number indicates the 
experimenter’s reservation price (in Euro) for the selected option: if your offer 
is larger than the reservation price, you pay the reservation price only and play 
the option.  If your offer is smaller than the reservation price, the experimenter 
will not sell the option.  You keep your money and the game ends. 
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